Contenido principal del artículo

There is a kind of logical theses that can be a cognitive problem. They are theses that are not tautologies and people tend to accept as absolutely correct. This is the case of theses such as those of Aristotle and Boethius. This paper tries to give an explanation of the reasons why this happens. The explanation is based on the theory of mental models. However, it also resorts to modal logic and the account of the ideas presented by Lenzen. Thus, relating the general framework of the theory of mental models to basic aspects of modal logic and this last account, a possible solution of the problem is proposed.

Miguel López-Astorga, Universidad de Talca

Profesor Titular del Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos de la Universidad de Talca
(Chile). Doctor en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia por la Universidad de Cádiz, España
(Grado de Doctor reconocido por la Universidad de Chile). Diploma de Estudios Avanzados
(Suficiencia Investigadora) en el área de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia por la Universidad
de Cádiz, España. Licenciado en Filosofía y Ciencias de la Educación (Sección Filosofía) por
la Universidad de Sevilla, España (título revalidado por el de Profesor de Educación Media
en Filosofía en la Universidad de Chile). Principales áreas de trabajo y de investigación:
Filosofía del Lenguaje; Filosofía de la Ciencia Cognitiva; Epistemología y Lógica.

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