The Possibility of the Clauses in the Conditional and Disjunction
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The theory of mental models gives an account of how human beings infer conclusions. That account is not coherent with classical logic. It admits inferences that are incorrect in that logic. Two of those inferences are addressed here. One of them allows deriving that the clauses of a conditional are possible if that conditional is true. The other one enables to deduce that the disjuncts of a disjunction are possible if that disjunction is true. Resorting to the way Chrysippus of Soli considers conditional relations, the present paper offers two axioms capturing the structures of these two inferences. The idea is that those axioms could be included in a hypothetical axiomatic system attempting to reproduce how human inferential processes are.
- Chrysippus of Soli
- Conditional
- Disjunction
- Mental models
- Reasoning
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