Simulating Searle
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After some decades of discussions about John Searle’s criticism ofcomputationalism, and especially of Artificial Intelligence, it is necessary totake those controversies in perspective. In spite of the great influence ofSearle’s approach, nor his mental experiment of “The Chinesse Room”, norhis distinction between simulation and duplication can be taken as showingthe failure of Computationalism. The contrast between “merely simulatedrealities” and “genuine realities” is not ontological, but epistemological. Andhis distinction between simulation and duplication is supported by a very ambiguous use of the notions of “cause” and “causal powers”. Against whatis intended by Searle, there are not conclusive a priory arguments for arejection of Computationalism.
- Mind
- computationalism
- Computationalism
- artificial intelligence
- Artificial intelligence
- simulation
- Simulation
- causal powers.
- Causal powers
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