Objectivity and the Female Epistemic Privilege in Hume’s Moral Philosophy

https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i61S.14372

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Published: Jun 5, 2025
Issue: No. 61S (2025): Praxis Filosófica No. 61 Supplement: Hume and the Feminine. Towards a New Philosophical Narrative
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Authors

  Carlota Salgadinho Ferreira Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Río de Janeiro, Brasil.
Abstract

This paper deals with the question of whether, based on Hume's ethics, in moral judgments in which gender is a relevant factor, there is an epistemic privilege of women as spectators and judges, that is, if they can judge the cases that concern them better than someone who is not female. I argue that although this question can be answered affirmatively, this privilege can be reversed by a combination of circumstances. To this end, I first present Hume's conception of the scientific nature of morality, according to which it is possible to form general rules about moral sentiments. Secondly, I explain the preponderance of the exercise of sympathy and comparison for the refinement of the moral sense and the achievement of what Hume calls the common point of view, which the philosopher understands as a criterion for judging moral virtue and vice. Thirdly, I clarify the concept of probability of chances, from which it is possible to establish causal reasoning about motives and actions, considering the relevance of the circumstances involved in them. Fourthly, I try to show that the scope of such a point of view requires the consideration of causally relevant circumstances, one of which is gender. Finally, I explain that the idea of humanity, in which the idea of (female) gender seems to be contained, can be understood as an abstract idea.

Keywords
  • Hume
  • Virtue and Vice
  • moral judgment
  • Circumstance
  • Feminine
Author Biography

Carlota Salgadinho Ferreira, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Río de Janeiro, Brasil.

Graduada e mestre pela Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto (FLUP/Portugal). Residente no Brasil desde 2016, obteve o título de doutora pelo Programa de Pós-graduação do Departamento de Filosofia da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) em 2020, tendo defendido a tese intitulada O quasi-realismo cético de David Hume. Desde então, atua como Professora do Quadro Complementar do mesmo departamento, lecionando disciplinas de Filosofia na graduação na mesma área e outras (tais como Comunicação, Psicologia, Sociologia, Engenharia e Administração), assim como no Programa de Pós-graduação Latu Sensu (Especialização), com estágio pós-doutoral na UFF em decorrência desde 2023. Desenvolve pesquisa na área de Filosofia Moderna, com ênfase na interface entre a epistemologia e a ética de Hume, mantendo também interesse nas filosofias de Aristóteles, Locke, Malebranche e Kant, assim como nas suas possíveis conexões com a filosofia humeana. Co-líder do Núcleo de Pensamento Moderno (NUPEM) PUC-Rio/CNPq desde 2024, dirige um grupo de leituras das obras de Hume. Pesquisadora associada ao Grupo Hume UFMG/CNPq, ao grupo Ceticismo Moderno UFMG/CNPq, à Associação Brasileira dos Estudos do Século XVIII (ABES18), à associação filosófica Scientia Studiae e à Sociedade Brasileira de Filosofia Analítica (SBFA).

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How to Cite
Salgadinho Ferreira, C. (2025). Objectivity and the Female Epistemic Privilege in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. Praxis Filosófica, (61S), e20414372. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i61S.14372
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