Main Article Content

Authors

The negation of free will implies that a human being is by nature not free, unless he or she can become so by rightly using his or her intellect. If so, freedom would be a privilege reserved only for the “wise men”. Consequently, when Spinoza identifies democracy as the form of government that best defends human freedom, learned men become its sole beneficiaries. Therefore, the “common herd” is not protected because only fear or hope nudges the ordinary populace to follow the commands of reason, rather than rational thought. Could this undesirable consequence be what hindered Spinoza in the completion of his Political Treatise, just as he was prepared to study the nature of democracy?

Jorge Aurelio Díaz, Universidad Católica de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia

PhD in philosophy from the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium); Professor emeritus at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia; Professor of the Humanities Department of the Universidad Católica de Colombia; Director of the Philosophia Personae Research Group (COL0091564). His latest publications are as follows: (2019). Educación, política y universidad. Analecta Política, IX(16), 37-54; (2018). Fe bíblica y filosofía. Franciscanum, LX, 143-168.

Mario David Fernández-Mora, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia

Political scientist, candidate for Master of Philosophy from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Master in Political Science from the University Paris 8.

Díaz, J. A., & Fernández-Mora, M. D. (2020). Democracy and Freedom According to B. Spinoza. Praxis Filosófica, (50), 11–24. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i50.8902

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
Received 2020-02-11
Accepted 2020-02-11
Published 2020-04-15