On unintentional communication

https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i47.6601

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Published: Jul 15, 2018
Issue: No. 47 (2018): Praxis Filosófica No. 47 julio-diciembre 2018
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Authors

José María Gil Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Mar del Plata, Argentina
Abstract

In philosophy of language, the study of communication and cognition has been a task developed by pragmatics. Within this field, one of the fundamental aims is to characterize the procedures involved in the transmission and the recognition of intentional meaning. Pragmatics can indeed account for communication in terms of such intentional meaning. However, there is also a very common phenomenon in everyday language use: Many times, and because of good reasons, the hearer interprets that the speaker’s utterance evokes certain meanings that do not have much to do with the speaker’s intention. This so common phenomenon can be called unintentional communication. Thus philosophical analysis allows us to explain that, for example, a Freudian slip is a communicative phenomenon in which the meanings that are recognized by the hearer on the basis of the utterance are very different (and even incompatible with) the intentional meaning of the speaker.

Keywords
  • communication
  • cognition
  • intentional meanings
  • unintentional meaning
  • relational networks
Author Biography

José María Gil, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Mar del Plata, Argentina

 Doctor en Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación (2003), por la Universidad Nacional de La Plata (UNLP). Cargos actuales: Investigador Independiente del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas (CONICET) y Profesor Titular Regular del área de Teoría del Conocimiento del Departamento de Filosofía, Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata (UNMDP). Becas internacionales: De la City University of Hong Kong (2010), la Comisión Fulbright  en EE.UU. (2009), de la Región Autónoma de Toscana en Italia (1999), del British Council en Inglaterra (1996-1997) y de Rotary Internacional en México (1996). Áreas de investigación: Lingüística, filosofía del lenguaje, enseñanza de la lengua.

E-mail: josemaria@gilmdq.com

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How to Cite
Gil, J. M. (2018). On unintentional communication. Praxis Filosófica, (47), 113–135. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i47.6601
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Received 2018-06-18
Accepted 2018-06-18
Published 2018-07-15
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