Heterogeneity and synthetic dependence. More on Kant and (anti) conceptualism
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This essay discusses the links between two theses from the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The first is that intuitions and concepts are representations of a different nature, and is known as the thesis of heterogeneity. The second, called thesis of synthetic dependence, is that intuitions depend on the synthetic activity of the understanding. The main proposal of the essay is that both theses are only reconcilable if conceptualism is abandoned, sustained position, among others, by Pedro Stepanenko (2016), and according to which intuitions have only representational content if they are subordinated to the understanding.
- intuition
- perception
- anticonceptualism
- heterogeneity
- epistemic collaboration
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Accepted 2018-06-18
Published 2018-07-15
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