Following a rule. Is it always a case of Knowledge?

https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i39.3516

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Published: Jul 15, 2014
Issue: No. 39 (2014): Praxis Filosófica No. 39 julio-diciembre 2014
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Authors

Juan Saharrea
Abstract

The following a rule´s discussion raises central questions about the nature of our concepts. In this essay, we place and discuss a thesis of Crispin Wright’s approach, namely following a rule always involves an epistemic commitment. According to our view, the following of rules for cases that Wright called “basic cases” (cases that cannot be reduced to a modus ponens structure of reasoning) carries no epistemic commitment. Such cases are basic linguistic commitments that without being true or false allow the rest of our conceptual building to be judged as true or false. So, we agreed with Wright on grasping any rule is a case that requires rational competence but we discuss his criterion to point out the rationality of rule.

Keywords
  • Rule
  • rule
  • Concepts
  • concepts
  • Wright
  • epistemic commitment
  • Epistemic commitment
  • rationality.
  • Rationality
Author Biography

Juan Saharrea

Jefe de trabajos prácticos de Filosofía en el Profesorado de Educación Especial en la Universidad Nacional de San Luis de Argentina (UNSL). Doctorando por la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC) e investigador de la Secretaria de Ciencia y Técnica de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (SeCyT). Ha publicado varios artículos sobre significado y comprensión en revistas nacionales. Sus principales áreas de investigación son filosofía de la mente y del lenguaje, lógica informal y ética. Entre sus artículos cabe mencionar “La parte constructiva del escepticismo” y “Cavell y la cuestión de los criterios”.
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How to Cite
Saharrea, J. (2014). Following a rule. Is it always a case of Knowledge?. Praxis Filosófica, (39), 93–109. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i39.3516
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