The principle of logical closure of knowledge and skepticism
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Current developments of modern skepticism have led to a resurgence ofsome of the problems presented by Descartes on the First Meditation. Withinthese developments are of particular concern, the Cartesian skepticismreconstructions supported on the principle of logical closure underimplication of the concept known. These reconstructions allow Cartesianskepticism to clear ontological and metaphysical assumptions and alsoenable to observe certain continuity with the Pyrrhonian skepticism. Thepurpose of this paper is to provide a Cartesian skepticism reconstruction ofFirst Meditation supported on the principle of logical
- skepticism
- principle of logical closure under known implication.
- modern skepticism
- Descartes
- pyrrhonism
- principle of logical closure under known implication
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