Disputes of Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus on logical necessity
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
This article deals with the position of Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus about logical necessity. It shows that Aristotle rejects logical necessity, by denying the universal application of the principle of bivalence, in order to preserve the value of deliberation. Secondly, it shows that Diodorus is led to fatalism due to his defense, based upon his modal notions, of the thesis according to which there are types of events logically contingent, but that still all particular events of the world are necessary.
- Bivalence
- fatalism and deliberation.
- necessity
- fatalism
- deliberation
ARISÓTELES (1966 ): Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
ARISTÓTELES. (1983): On interpretation. Londres: Loeb Classical Library.
BOBZIEN, S. (1993): “Chrysippus’ modal logic and its relation to Philo and Diodorus”. Dialektiker und Stoiker. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
BOECIO. (1880): In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione. Leipzig.
CICERÓN. (1991): On Fate & Boethius the consolation of philosophy. Londres: Aris & Phillips ltd.
CICERÓN. (2005): Del Hado. México: Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum mexicana.
GASKIN, R. (1995): The sea battle and the master argument: Aristotle and Diodorus chronus on the Metaphysics of the future. Berlin/Ne w York: Gruyter.
HANKINSON, R. J. (1999): “Determinism and Indeterminism”. The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge, CUP.
LAERCIO, D. (1925) Lifes of eminent philosophers. Londres, Loeb Classical Library.
SEDLEY, D. (1977): “Diodorus Chronus and Hellenistic Philosophy”. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society. 203 (23), 74-120.
Downloads
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
De acuerdo con nuestra política (Licencia Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) los artículos presentados y sometidos al proceso editorial en la revista Praxis Filosófica no tienen costo alguno para sus autores ni retribuciones económicas para la revista. El artículo de carácter inédito, producto de investigación o de algún proyecto que se presente a Praxis Filosófica, no podrá estar sometido a otro proceso de publicación durante el proceso que se lleve en nuestra revista.