Value judgments, truth and objectivity
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In this essay I discuss whether we should understand the objectivity of evaluative judgments in the same terms as we do with epistemic judgments. I argue for a domain-specific understanding of objectivity, according to which we should see truth as central to epistemic objectivity, but not to evaluative objectivity. However, this position has traditionally led to see these judgments as subjective. Here I argue that the lack of truth values does not necessarily lead to subjectivism—not if we do not conceive evaluative judgments as expressions of feelings or desires without any rational constraints. In the case of the objectivity of evaluative judgments, the emphasis should go on justification, rather than on truth. However, justification alone is no guarantee of objectivity (but, in the same way, neither is truth). I try to delve into some of the conditions necessary to claim objectivity of evaluative judgments and also distinguish between types of objectivity.
- Objectivity
- objectivity
- Value judgments
- value judgments
- Truth
- truth
- Justification
- justification
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