Sense-data, introspection and the reality of appearances
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Nowadays philosophers of perception often dismiss sense-data theory as something extravagant, without further qualifications or detailed arguments, despite its historical importance and current influence. In this paper I will properly reassess its basic commitments and consequences in light of new developments in the philosophies of mind and perception. I will examine in detail the nature of sense-data and I will point out that sense-data theory not only carries the unacceptable ontological and epistemological consequences frequently identified, but that it also cannot be conclusively established or refuted solely on the basis of introspective evidence as many authors have previously suggested.
- Datos sensoriales
- Sense-data
- Mundo externo
- external world
- Subjetivismo
- subjectivism
- Fisicalismo
- physicalism
- Introspección
- introspection.
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