Teoría kantiana del espacio, geometría y experiencia

Abstract

In this paper I show that Kant had not reason to claim that the principles of geometry are synthetic judgments 

a priori . This thesis is the starting point of Kant’s epistemology and of his philosophical reflection about space and Euclidean geometry. The Kant’s thesis fails in two points: one, when he claims that the axioms of geometry have an apodeictically certain; and two, when he claims that the knowledge of the structure of physical space is  a priori , independent of observation and experience. The development of non-Euclidean geometries carries to refute the first part of Kant’s thesis and leave the second part up in the air. This second part of Kant’s thesis fall through with Einstein’s general theory of relativity. I present these different ideas and thesis with in a historical perspective, explaining and justifying the principal ideas of Euclides, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Poincaré and Einstein, the main character in this debate. And finally, I contrast these ideas with Kant’s approach, in all moment.