Toleration, Autonomy and The Harm Principle (es)
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Because of the inherited tradition of Modernity, there is a strong relation between tolerance and rational autonomy. By examining examples, I show that sometimes people lead their lives according to conceptions beyond rational considerations, and therefore do not satisfy the criterion of rational autonomy; but even so their views are legitimate and should be tolerated. I conclude by arguing that tolerance cannot rely solely on the concept of autonomy, instead I propose a concept of tolerance based on the harm principle: we cannot perform actions that significantly affect other people, preventing them from living according to conceptions of good that are deeply meaningful to them.
- Toleration
- toleration
- Freedom of conscience
- freedom of conscience
- Autonomy
- autonomy
- Harm principle
- harm principle
- Constitutive ends
- constitutive ends.
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