Kierkegaard on the problems of pure irony
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Søren Kierkegaard’s thesis, The Concept of Irony, contains an interestingcritique of pure irony. Kierkegaard’s critique turns on two main claims: a)pure irony is an incoherent and thus, unrealizable stance; b) the pursuit ofpure irony is morally enervating, psychologically destructive, and culminates in bondage to moods. In this essay, first I attempt to clarify Kierkegaard’sunderstanding of pure irony as “infinite absolute negativity”. Then I setforth his multilayered critique of pure irony. Finally, I consider briefly adistinctly theological component in Kierkegaard’s critique. I argue that thisfeature of Kierkegaard’s account can and should be distinguished from thebroadly ethical critique of pure irony that I sketch in the second section,even if these components of Kierkegaard’s position are found together as aunified whole in The Concept of Irony. My overall goal in this essay is toreveal the subtlety and plausibility of Kierkegaard’s critique of pure irony. Ialso attempt to disclose the richness of the Hegelian account of ethical life towhich Kierkegaard recurs in his thesis.
- Kierkegaard
- irony
- pure irony
- Sittlichkeit
- personal identity
Hincapié Sánchez, J. (2007). Kierkegaard on the problems of pure irony. Praxis Filosófica, (24), 167–199. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i24.3138
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