Theoretical syllogism, practical reasoning and rhetorical-dialectical reasoning.

Abstract

Practical syllogism or the reasoning of the action (EN VI, 12, 1144ª 31, “oigar sillogismoi tvn praktvn”) is presented by many scholars ofAristotelic works as a form of explanation whose intention is to account forthe movement realized by the human soul from pure appetite or desire untilthe moment of firm action. The point of view discussed here can be presentedin two related theses; 1) practical reasoning is not a syllogism - it consists ofmany more aspects which cannot be reduced to the formal structure of aperfect syllogism; 2) practical syllogism is based above all on rhetoricaldialecticreasoning, be it an enthymeme, a paradigm, or an epiquerema; it is adiscursive process of deliberation with imperfect syllogisms or chains ofprobable syllogisms which guide deliberation by means of sorites andrhetorical inductions. It is not a demonstration of things which are necessarily,and unable to be, otherwise, but of what is possible and contingent, thatwhich can or cannot be, since there is only deliberation on what is possible,and this is done with probable opinions. It therefore corresponds to therhetoric and dialectic to reason with this type of premise. The rule of conductof practical syllogism takes as its premise a generally accepted opinion (suchas a hypothesis or conjecture), whose application to the particular case iscontingent and its result, the action, also is, since it can be either realized ornot realized. The action as a consequence of reasoning goes beyond theformal logical framework of syllogism.