The problem of generality in reliabilist epistemology

Abstract

Discussions on reliabilist epistemology use to focus in the examination ofreliable process theories, according to which, a belief is justified iff is theoutcome of processes that are generally reliable. But the notion of reliabletype-process is a very controversial one. For example, authors like Coneeand Feldman think that theories of justification of reliable processes arehopelessly defective due to the problem of generality. In this paper Iintend to give an outline of the central idea of justification from a reliabilistperspective, and to determine the point up to which Conee and Feldmanscriticisms against the Alstonian notion of reliabilism of process are tenable.Finally, I suggest a strategy to neutralize Conee and Feldmans objectionsand I give a schematic proposal to justify the type-processes generated byreliable beliefs.