Characterizing logical disagreement (spanish version)
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In this paper, I provide a characterization of logical disagreement. According to my notion, the merely verbal disagreements in logic are unusual. Most logical disagreements are just descriptive disagreements about the world or about the meaning of the connectives, while others are evaluative disagreements about the notion of validity.
- Logical Disagreement
- Verbal Disagreement
- Logical Constants
- Logical Consequence
- Non-Classical Logics
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