Of Reasons and Passions in René Descartes
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To present what Descartes said about reason and the passions, we must understand his reasons for giving the mind the privileged place it receives in his philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes defended his dualism without making concessions about the incorporeal nature of the mind due to the demands of his scientific-philosophical project. On the other hand, along Cartesian works, the conception of the union of the body and mind of human beings, as well as their intermingling, appears. The presence of dualism and union in Descartes' works has generated diverse interpretations. For a better understanding of the Cartesian conception in this regard, I reconsider them from a perspective opposite to those who consider Descartes' proposal contradictory. This perspective allows us to recognize the anthropological (moral, psychological, social) aspects of Cartesian thought and see that he was also a thinker about the passions.
- Reason
- Dualism
- Passions
- Cartesian Science
- Moral
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Accepted 2024-10-04
Published 2024-12-20
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