The Problem of World Change: A Conceptualist Approach
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From Kuhn´s theses about scientific revolutions and incommensurable paradigms it seems that a problem could be derived, known as the problem of world change. Here I intend an examination of that problem ―which has both a semantic face and an ontological face― in order to elucidate it and to show that Kuhn´s taxonomic solution and Hacking´s nominalist solution to it are not only compatible but even complementary, that together provides a dual solution, an ontosemantic one.
- Conceptual Change
- Lexicon
- Kind
- Individual Entity
- Ontological Commitment
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Accepted 2021-05-25
Published 2021-08-15
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