Conceptualismo empírico categorial
Experiencia perceptiva Contenido conceptual Contenido no-conceptual Categorización Fineza de grano
Barra lateral del artículo
Publicado:
jul. 15, 2017
Sección
Artículos
Contenido principal del artículo
Mi objetivo en este trabajo es ofrecer los lineamientos generales de una forma revisada de conceptualismo, en el marco del debate entre conceptualistas y no-conceptualistas respecto del tipo de contenido de la experiencia perceptiva, que mantenga las tesis centrales del conceptualismo tradicional pero sea capaz de, a diferencia de este, ofrecer respuestas satisfactorias al problema de la fineza de grano de la experiencia perceptiva. Para ello, presento un marco teórico general, el Conceptualismo Empírico, desarrollo a partir de él una posición conceptualista sustantiva, el Conceptualismo Empírico Categorial, y muestro como éste puede utilizarse para responder el problema de la fineza de grano.
Serrano, N. A. (2017). Conceptualismo empírico categorial. Praxis Filosófica, (45S), 113–143. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i45S.6131
Becker, M.,W., Pashler, H., y Anstis, S., M., (2000). “The Role of Iconic Memory in Change-detection Tasks”, Perception, 29, pp. 273-286.
Bermúdez, J. (1994). “Peacocke’s Argument against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 293-307.
Bermúdez, J. (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Bermúdez, J. (2007). “What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, Suplemento: Philosophical Perspectives, 21, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 55-72.
Brewer, B. (1999). Perception and Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Brewer, B. (2001). “Précis of Perception and Reason”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 405-416.
Brewer, B. (2005). “Perceptual experience has conceptual content”, en E. Sosa y M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 217-230.
Byrne, A. (2005). “Perception and Conceptual Content”, en E. Sosa y M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 231-250.
Carruthers, P. (2006). The Architecture of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, H., y Lefebvre, C. (Eds.) (2005). Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Oxford, Elsevier.
Coltheart, M. (1983). “Ecological necessity of iconic memory”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, pp. 17-18.
Crane, T. (1988). “The Waterfall Ilussion”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 231-236.
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York, Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J.(2007). “The revenge of the given”, en B.P. McLaughlin y J. Cohen (eds.) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, Malden (Mass.)/Oxford/Carlton (Victoria), Blackwell, pp. 105-116.
Fodor, J. (2008). LOT2.The language of thought revisited, Oxford, Oxford U.P.
Forder, L., et alia (2016). “Colour terms affect detection of colour and color-associated objects suppressed from visual awareness”, PLoS ONE 11(3): e0152212.
Harnad, S. (2005). “To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization”, en H. Cohen and C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Oxford, Elsevier, pp. 19-30.
Heck, R., G. (2000). “Non-Conceptual Content and the ‘Space of Reasons’”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 483-523.
Lupyan, G. (2012). “Linguistically Modulated Perception and Cognition: The Label-Feedback Hypothesis”, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 3, pp. 1-13.
Lupyan, G., y Ward, E. J. (2013). “Language can boost otherwise unseen objects into visual awareness”, Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences, Vol. 110, No. 35, pp. 14196-14201.
Margolis E., y Laurence S. (2007). “The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 561-593.
McDowell J. (1994a). Mind and World, Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Press.
McDowell J. (1994b). “The content of perceptual experience”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175, pp. 190-205.
McDowell J. (1996). “Afterword”, en Mind and World (1996), Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Press.
McDowell J. (1998). “Reply to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 403-431.
McDowell J. (2009). Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1986). “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 297-329.
McDowell J. (1992). “Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 107-132.
McDowell J. (1994). “Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 309-322.
McDowell J. (1998). “Nonconceptual Content Defended (Comment on McDowell’s ‘Mind and World’)”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 381-88.
McDowell J. (2001). “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5, pp. 239-264.
Piccinini, G. y Scott, S. (2006). “Splitting Concepts”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 390-409.
Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Rosch, E. (1978). “Principles of categorization”, en E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 27-48.
Skidelsky, L. (2006). “Personal-Subpersonal: The Problem of Inter-level Relations”, Protosociology, Special Issue: Compositionality, Concepts and Representations II: New Problems in Cognitive Science, 22, pp. 120-139.
Skidelsky, L. (2007). “La distinción doxástico-subdoxástico”, Crítica, Vol. 39, No. 115, pp. 31-60.
Speaks, J. (2005). “Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 359-398.
Sperling, G. (1960). “The information available in brief visual presentations”, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74 (11, No. 498), pp. 1-29.
Spelke, E. (1990). “Principles of Object Perception”, Cognitive Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 29-56.
Spelke, E. (1992). “Origins of Knowledge”, Psychological Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 605-632.
Sun Y., Cai Y., Lu S. (2015). “Hemispheric asymmetry in the influence of language on visual perception”, Consciousness and Cognition, 34:16–27.
Thierry G., et alia (2009). “Unconscious effects of language-specific terminology on preattentive color perception”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 11, pp. 4567–4570.
Winawer, J., et alia (2007). “Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, No.19, pp. 7780-7785.
Bermúdez, J. (1994). “Peacocke’s Argument against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 293-307.
Bermúdez, J. (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Bermúdez, J. (2007). “What Is at Stake in the Debate on Nonconceptual Content?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, Suplemento: Philosophical Perspectives, 21, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 55-72.
Brewer, B. (1999). Perception and Reason, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Brewer, B. (2001). “Précis of Perception and Reason”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 405-416.
Brewer, B. (2005). “Perceptual experience has conceptual content”, en E. Sosa y M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 217-230.
Byrne, A. (2005). “Perception and Conceptual Content”, en E. Sosa y M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 231-250.
Carruthers, P. (2006). The Architecture of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, H., y Lefebvre, C. (Eds.) (2005). Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Oxford, Elsevier.
Coltheart, M. (1983). “Ecological necessity of iconic memory”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6, pp. 17-18.
Crane, T. (1988). “The Waterfall Ilussion”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 231-236.
Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York, Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J.(2007). “The revenge of the given”, en B.P. McLaughlin y J. Cohen (eds.) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, Malden (Mass.)/Oxford/Carlton (Victoria), Blackwell, pp. 105-116.
Fodor, J. (2008). LOT2.The language of thought revisited, Oxford, Oxford U.P.
Forder, L., et alia (2016). “Colour terms affect detection of colour and color-associated objects suppressed from visual awareness”, PLoS ONE 11(3): e0152212.
Harnad, S. (2005). “To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization”, en H. Cohen and C. Lefebvre (Eds.) Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, Oxford, Elsevier, pp. 19-30.
Heck, R., G. (2000). “Non-Conceptual Content and the ‘Space of Reasons’”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 4, pp. 483-523.
Lupyan, G. (2012). “Linguistically Modulated Perception and Cognition: The Label-Feedback Hypothesis”, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 3, pp. 1-13.
Lupyan, G., y Ward, E. J. (2013). “Language can boost otherwise unseen objects into visual awareness”, Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences, Vol. 110, No. 35, pp. 14196-14201.
Margolis E., y Laurence S. (2007). “The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?”, Noûs, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 561-593.
McDowell J. (1994a). Mind and World, Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Press.
McDowell J. (1994b). “The content of perceptual experience”, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175, pp. 190-205.
McDowell J. (1996). “Afterword”, en Mind and World (1996), Cambridge, Massachusets, Harvard University Press.
McDowell J. (1998). “Reply to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 403-431.
McDowell J. (2009). Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Peacocke, C. (1986). “Perceptual Content”, en Themes from Kaplan, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 297-329.
McDowell J. (1992). “Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 107-132.
McDowell J. (1994). “Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations”, en Gunther, Y., H., (Ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content (2003), Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, pp. 309-322.
McDowell J. (1998). “Nonconceptual Content Defended (Comment on McDowell’s ‘Mind and World’)”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 381-88.
McDowell J. (2001). “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 5, pp. 239-264.
Piccinini, G. y Scott, S. (2006). “Splitting Concepts”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 390-409.
Prinz, J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Rosch, E. (1978). “Principles of categorization”, en E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and Categorization, Hillsdale, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 27-48.
Skidelsky, L. (2006). “Personal-Subpersonal: The Problem of Inter-level Relations”, Protosociology, Special Issue: Compositionality, Concepts and Representations II: New Problems in Cognitive Science, 22, pp. 120-139.
Skidelsky, L. (2007). “La distinción doxástico-subdoxástico”, Crítica, Vol. 39, No. 115, pp. 31-60.
Speaks, J. (2005). “Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 359-398.
Sperling, G. (1960). “The information available in brief visual presentations”, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74 (11, No. 498), pp. 1-29.
Spelke, E. (1990). “Principles of Object Perception”, Cognitive Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 29-56.
Spelke, E. (1992). “Origins of Knowledge”, Psychological Review, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 605-632.
Sun Y., Cai Y., Lu S. (2015). “Hemispheric asymmetry in the influence of language on visual perception”, Consciousness and Cognition, 34:16–27.
Thierry G., et alia (2009). “Unconscious effects of language-specific terminology on preattentive color perception”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 11, pp. 4567–4570.
Winawer, J., et alia (2007). “Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, No.19, pp. 7780-7785.
Recibido 2018-01-31
Aceptado 2018-01-31
Publicado 2017-07-15
Aceptado 2018-01-31
Publicado 2017-07-15
De acuerdo con nuestra política (Licencia Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) los artículos presentados y sometidos al proceso editorial en la revista Praxis Filosófica no tienen costo alguno para sus autores ni retribuciones económicas para la revista. El artículo de carácter inédito, producto de investigación o de algún proyecto que se presente a Praxis Filosófica, no podrá estar sometido a otro proceso de publicación durante el proceso que se lleve en nuestra revista.