TEORÍAS DE LA CONCIENCIA
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La conciencia fenoménica es la propiedad que los estados, sucesos y procesos mentales poseen cuando, y sólo cuando, hay algo que es como algo para el sujeto que los posee; para experimentarlos o estar en tales estados. Hay algo que es como oler café recién preparado. Tener la experiencia de oler café recién preparado es un estado fenoménicamente conciente. Comúnmente, qué es algo como tener una experiencia conciente refiere al carácter fenoménico de las experiencias. Las teorías de la conciencia intentan explicar éste carácter fenoménico.
Muñoz-Suárez, C. M. (2009). TEORÍAS DE LA CONCIENCIA. Praxis Filosófica, (29), 179–188. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i29.3295
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Block, N. J. [1990]: “Inverted Earth”, Philosophical Perspective, 4, pp. 52– 79.
Byrne, A. [1997]: “Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts”,Philosophical Studies, 86, pp. 103– 29.
Carruthers, P. [2000]: Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-versity Press.
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Chalmers, D. J. [2002]: “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature” en D. J. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. [2004]: “The Representational Character of Experience” en B. Leiter (ed.) The Future for Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Dennett, D. C. [1991]: Consciousness Explained, Boston, MA, Little Brown.
Dretske, F. I. [1995]: Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Harman, G. [1990]: “The Intrinsic quality of Experience”, Philosophical Perspec-tives, 4, pp. 31– 52.
Jackson, F. C. [1984]: “Epiphenomenal qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 34, pp. 147– 52.
Kim, J. [1989]: “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3, pp. 77– 108.
Kim, J. [2001]: “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism,” en K. Corcoran (ed.) Soul, Body and Survival: Essays in the Metaphysics of Human Persons, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
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Kriegel, U. [2003]: “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, pp. 103–32.
Levine, J. [2001]: Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Levine, J. [2006]: “Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation”, en U. Kriegel y K.Williford (eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lycan,W. G. [1996]: Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Lycan, W. G. [2001]: “A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory ofConsciousness”, Analysis, 61, pp. 3– 4.
Neander, K. [1998]: “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Repre-sentational Theories of Consciousness”, PhilosophicalPerspectives, 12, pp. 411– 434.
Noë, A. [2004]: Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Peacocke, C.A. B. [1983]: Sense and Content, Oxford, Clarendon.
Putnam, H. [1967]: “The Nature of Mental States”, originalmente publicado como “Psychological Predicates” en W. H. Capitan y D. D. Merrill (ed.) Art, Mind, and Religion. Reimpreso en D. M. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. [1986]: “Two Concepts of Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies, 94, pp. 329– 359.
Rosenthal, D. M. [1990]: “A Theory of Consciousness”, ZiF Technical Report, 40, bielfield, Germany. reimpreso en [1997]: N. J. block, O. Flanagan y G. Guzeldere (eds.) TheNature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. [2002]: “Explaining Consciousness” en D. J. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Shoemaker, S. [1975]: “Functionalism and qualia”, Philosophical Studies, 27, pp. 291– 315.
Smart, J. J. C. [1959]: “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review, 68, pp. 141– 156.
Smith, D.W. [1986]: “The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness”, Topoi, 5, pp. 149– 156.
Smith, D.W. [1989]: The Circle of Acquaintance, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tye, M. [1995]: Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Tye, M. [2000]: Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Van Gulick, R. [2001]: “Inward and Upward – reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness”, Philosophical Topics, 28, pp. 275– 305.
Van Gulick, R. [2006]: “Mirror Mirror – Is that All?” en U. Kriegel and K.Williford (eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Baars, B. [1988]: A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Baars, B. [1997]: In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Block, N. J. [1978]: “Troubles with Functionalism”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9, pp. 261– 325.
Block, N. J. [1990]: “Inverted Earth”, Philosophical Perspective, 4, pp. 52– 79.
Byrne, A. [1997]: “Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts”,Philosophical Studies, 86, pp. 103– 29.
Carruthers, P. [2000]: Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-versity Press.
Chalmers, D. J. [1996]: The Conscious Mind, Oxford y New York, Oxford Uni-versity Press.
Chalmers, D. J. [2002]: “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature” en D. J. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. J. [2004]: “The Representational Character of Experience” en B. Leiter (ed.) The Future for Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. [1981] “Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness” en Brains-torms, Brighton, Harvester.
Dennett, D. C. [1991]: Consciousness Explained, Boston, MA, Little Brown.
Dretske, F. I. [1995]: Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Harman, G. [1990]: “The Intrinsic quality of Experience”, Philosophical Perspec-tives, 4, pp. 31– 52.
Jackson, F. C. [1984]: “Epiphenomenal qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 34, pp. 147– 52.
Kim, J. [1989]: “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion”, Philosophical Perspectives, 3, pp. 77– 108.
Kim, J. [2001]: “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism,” en K. Corcoran (ed.) Soul, Body and Survival: Essays in the Metaphysics of Human Persons, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Kriegel, U. [2002]: “PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness”, Philosophical Psychology, 15, pp. 55– 64.
Kriegel, U. [2003]: “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33, pp. 103–32.
Levine, J. [2001]: Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Levine, J. [2006]: “Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation”, en U. Kriegel y K.Williford (eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lycan,W. G. [1996]: Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Lycan, W. G. [2001]: “A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory ofConsciousness”, Analysis, 61, pp. 3– 4.
Neander, K. [1998]: “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Repre-sentational Theories of Consciousness”, PhilosophicalPerspectives, 12, pp. 411– 434.
Noë, A. [2004]: Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Peacocke, C.A. B. [1983]: Sense and Content, Oxford, Clarendon.
Putnam, H. [1967]: “The Nature of Mental States”, originalmente publicado como “Psychological Predicates” en W. H. Capitan y D. D. Merrill (ed.) Art, Mind, and Religion. Reimpreso en D. M. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. [1986]: “Two Concepts of Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies, 94, pp. 329– 359.
Rosenthal, D. M. [1990]: “A Theory of Consciousness”, ZiF Technical Report, 40, bielfield, Germany. reimpreso en [1997]: N. J. block, O. Flanagan y G. Guzeldere (eds.) TheNature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Rosenthal, D. M. [2002]: “Explaining Consciousness” en D. J. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind, Oxford y New York, Oxford University Press.
Shoemaker, S. [1975]: “Functionalism and qualia”, Philosophical Studies, 27, pp. 291– 315.
Smart, J. J. C. [1959]: “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review, 68, pp. 141– 156.
Smith, D.W. [1986]: “The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness”, Topoi, 5, pp. 149– 156.
Smith, D.W. [1989]: The Circle of Acquaintance, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tye, M. [1995]: Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Tye, M. [2000]: Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Van Gulick, R. [2001]: “Inward and Upward – reflection, Introspection, and Self-Awareness”, Philosophical Topics, 28, pp. 275– 305.
Van Gulick, R. [2006]: “Mirror Mirror – Is that All?” en U. Kriegel and K.Williford (eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
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