Language processing and informational semantics
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
According to Fodor, the processing of linguistic information would operate on representations of the language of thought. Could the content of these representations be understood in terms of the informational semantics proposed by Fodor? The author seems to maintain that yes, but in this work I would like to show that the content of these representations could not be informational. The reasons are related to the difficulties of adopting a type of externalist semantics (such as informational) for the case of the representations of the processing systems.
- l-language
- Mental Representations
- Language of Thought
- Mental Content
- Functional Analysis
Atkinson, A. (1998). Wholes and their Parts in Cognitive Psychology: Systems, Subsystems, and Persons. Recuperado de http://cogprints.org/337/
Aydede, M. (2004). The Language of Thought Hypothesis. En E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Recuperado de http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought.
Bermúdez, J. L. (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind & Language, 10(4), 333-369.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations, 3(1), 63-82.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2008). Nonconceptual Mental Content. En E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (primera edición primavera de 2003). Recuperado de http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-nonconceptual/.
Chomsky, N. (1995). El programa minimalista. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Cummins, R. (1983). The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Davies, M. (2000). Persons and their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explanations, 3(1), 43-62.
Dennett, D. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Londres, Inglaterra: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Dretske, F. (1981). Conocimiento e información. Barcelona, España: Salvat.
Egan, F. (1992). Individualism, Computation and Perceptual Content. Mind, 101(403), 443-459.
Egan, F. (1995). Computation and Content. The Philosophical Review, 104(2), 181-203.
Egan, F. (1999). In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind and Language, 14(2), 177-194.
Ellis, A. W. y Young, A. W. (1992). Neuropsicología cognitiva humana. Barcelona, España: Masson.
Evans, G. (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford, Inglaterra: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1975). El lenguaje del pensamiento. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psicosemántica. Madrid, España: Tecnos.
Fodor, J. A. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1997). El olmo y el experto. Barcelona, España: Paidós.
Fodor, J. (1998). Conceptos. Donde la ciencia cognitiva se equivocó. Barcelona, España: Gedisa.
Fodor, J. (2001). Language, Thought and Compositionality. Mind and Language, 16(1), 1-15.
Fodor, J. (2004). Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind & Language, 19(1), 29-47.
Fodor. J. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford, Inglaterra: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J., y Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: a Critical Analysis. En C. McDonald y G. McDonald (Eds.), Connectionism: Debates of psychological explanation, Vol II (90-163). Oxford, Inglaterra: Blackwell.
García-Albea, J. E. (1984). El lenguaje del pensamiento. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Hempel, C. (1965). La explicación psicológica. Barcelona, España: Paidós.
Hornsby, J. (1997). Simple Mindedness. Cambridge, Inglaterra: Harvard University Press.
Hornstein, N., Nunes, J., y Grohann, K. (2005). Undestanding Minimalism: An Introduction to Minimalist Syntax. Cambridge, Inglaterra: Cambridge University Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1991). The Problem of Reality. Nous, 25(4), 411-433.
Marr, D. (1982). Visión. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1993). Externalist Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93(1), 203-230.
Peacocke, C. (1995). Content, Computation and Externalism. Philosophical Issues, 6, 227-264.
Schneider, S. (2008). The Language of Thought. En P. Calvo y J. Simons (Eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 280-295). Nueva York, EUA: Routledge.
Sterelny, K. (2001). Language of Thought. En R. A. Wilson y F. C. Keil (Eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (pp.451-453). Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Skidelsky, L. (2006). Personal-Subpersonal: The Problems of Inter-level Relations. Protosociology. Special Issue: Compositionality, Concepts and Representations II: New Problems in Cognitive Science, 22, 120-139.
Weiskopf, D. (2009). Atomism, Pluralism and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), 131-136.
Aydede, M. (2004). The Language of Thought Hypothesis. En E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Recuperado de http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought.
Bermúdez, J. L. (1995). Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States. Mind & Language, 10(4), 333-369.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations, 3(1), 63-82.
Bermúdez, J. L. (2008). Nonconceptual Mental Content. En E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (primera edición primavera de 2003). Recuperado de http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-nonconceptual/.
Chomsky, N. (1995). El programa minimalista. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Cummins, R. (1983). The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Davies, M. (2000). Persons and their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explanations, 3(1), 43-62.
Dennett, D. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Londres, Inglaterra: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Dretske, F. (1981). Conocimiento e información. Barcelona, España: Salvat.
Egan, F. (1992). Individualism, Computation and Perceptual Content. Mind, 101(403), 443-459.
Egan, F. (1995). Computation and Content. The Philosophical Review, 104(2), 181-203.
Egan, F. (1999). In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind and Language, 14(2), 177-194.
Ellis, A. W. y Young, A. W. (1992). Neuropsicología cognitiva humana. Barcelona, España: Masson.
Evans, G. (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford, Inglaterra: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. (1975). El lenguaje del pensamiento. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psicosemántica. Madrid, España: Tecnos.
Fodor, J. A. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1997). El olmo y el experto. Barcelona, España: Paidós.
Fodor, J. (1998). Conceptos. Donde la ciencia cognitiva se equivocó. Barcelona, España: Gedisa.
Fodor, J. (2001). Language, Thought and Compositionality. Mind and Language, 16(1), 1-15.
Fodor, J. (2004). Having Concepts: a Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century. Mind & Language, 19(1), 29-47.
Fodor. J. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford, Inglaterra: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J., y Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: a Critical Analysis. En C. McDonald y G. McDonald (Eds.), Connectionism: Debates of psychological explanation, Vol II (90-163). Oxford, Inglaterra: Blackwell.
García-Albea, J. E. (1984). El lenguaje del pensamiento. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Hempel, C. (1965). La explicación psicológica. Barcelona, España: Paidós.
Hornsby, J. (1997). Simple Mindedness. Cambridge, Inglaterra: Harvard University Press.
Hornstein, N., Nunes, J., y Grohann, K. (2005). Undestanding Minimalism: An Introduction to Minimalist Syntax. Cambridge, Inglaterra: Cambridge University Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1991). The Problem of Reality. Nous, 25(4), 411-433.
Marr, D. (1982). Visión. Madrid, España: Alianza.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1993). Externalist Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93(1), 203-230.
Peacocke, C. (1995). Content, Computation and Externalism. Philosophical Issues, 6, 227-264.
Schneider, S. (2008). The Language of Thought. En P. Calvo y J. Simons (Eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 280-295). Nueva York, EUA: Routledge.
Sterelny, K. (2001). Language of Thought. En R. A. Wilson y F. C. Keil (Eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (pp.451-453). Cambridge, EUA: MIT Press.
Skidelsky, L. (2006). Personal-Subpersonal: The Problems of Inter-level Relations. Protosociology. Special Issue: Compositionality, Concepts and Representations II: New Problems in Cognitive Science, 22, 120-139.
Weiskopf, D. (2009). Atomism, Pluralism and Conceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), 131-136.
Destéfano, M. (2019). Language processing and informational semantics. Praxis Filosófica, (48), 153–174. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i48.7313
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
De acuerdo con nuestra política (Licencia Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) los artículos presentados y sometidos al proceso editorial en la revista Praxis Filosófica no tienen costo alguno para sus autores ni retribuciones económicas para la revista. El artículo de carácter inédito, producto de investigación o de algún proyecto que se presente a Praxis Filosófica, no podrá estar sometido a otro proceso de publicación durante el proceso que se lleve en nuestra revista.