@article{Reinoso_2022, title={Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal}, url={https://praxisfilosofica.univalle.edu.co/index.php/praxis/article/view/11935}, DOI={10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i54.11935}, abstractNote={<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Fogelin (2002 [1976]; 1992 [1981]; 1994) was the first one to speak about “Neopyrrhonism” to link Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. To him, Pyrrhonism “combines philosophical scepticism with scepticism</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><em> about</em> </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">philosophy, that is, to have doubts about philosophy on the basis of philosophical arguments” (1994, p. 3). Following this interpretation, Neopyrrhonism can be understood as a kind of scepticism that cancels philosophy using self-destructive arguments </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">(</span><em><span style="font-weight: 400;">peritrope</span></em><span style="font-weight: 400;">). Both Sextus -with his proposal of suspension of judgment- and Wittgenstein -with his idea of the dissolution of philosophical problems- are representatives of</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> quietism. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Neopyrrhonism as quietism can be conceived of as a </span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><em>therapeutic</em> </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">proposal mainly based on not postulating an argumentative-constructive philosophical theory. Against this perspective, I propose interpreting Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy, from which a </span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><em>performative</em> </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">proposal emerges. In this approach, Neopyrrhonism is an open-ended inquiry that implies the ability of using different philosophical argumentative strategies in a performative sense to encourage a new way of exercising philosophy. </span></p>}, number={54}, journal={Praxis Filosófica}, author={Reinoso, Guadalupe}, year={2022}, month={abr.}, pages={11–30} }