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Fogelin (2002 [1976]; 1992 [1981]; 1994) was the first one to speak about “Neopyrrhonism” to link Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus. To him, Pyrrhonism “combines philosophical scepticism with scepticism about philosophy, that is, to have doubts about philosophy on the basis of philosophical arguments” (1994, p. 3). Following this interpretation, Neopyrrhonism can be understood as a kind of scepticism that cancels philosophy using self-destructive arguments (peritrope). Both Sextus -with his proposal of suspension of judgment- and Wittgenstein -with his idea of the dissolution of philosophical problems- are representatives of quietism. Neopyrrhonism as quietism can be conceived of as a therapeutic proposal mainly based on not postulating an argumentative-constructive philosophical theory. Against this perspective, I propose interpreting Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy, from which a performative proposal emerges. In this approach, Neopyrrhonism is an open-ended inquiry that implies the ability of using different philosophical argumentative strategies in a performative sense to encourage a new way of exercising philosophy. 

Guadalupe Reinoso, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología (SeCyT)

Profesora de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Licenciada y Doctora en filosofía por la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Su área de especialización es: Escepticismo, Pirronismo, Wittgenstein, Metafilosofía; y su área de competencia: Filosofía Contemporánea, Filosofía del lenguaje, Filosofía moderna. Directora del grupo de investigación. Pirronismo y Neo-pirronismo: el influjo del escepticismo antiguo en la filosofía contemporánea. SeCyT, UNC (2018-2023). Sus publicaciones recientes son: (2021) Revisionism of Vargas’s revisionism: Free will, Disagreements, Common Sense and Neopyrrhonism. Análisis Revista de investigación en Filosofía (Arif), 8(1), 3-21. https://doi.org/10.26754/ojs_arif/arif.202115352; (2020) Formas lógicas y formas de vida. La distinción entre proposiciones lógicas y empíricas y la distinción mostrar-decir en Sobre la Certeza. Análisis Filosófico (SADAF), 40(1), 89-108, https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.428.

Reinoso, G. . (2022). Neopyrrhonism as Metaphilosophy: A Non-Quietist Proposal. Praxis Filosófica, (54), 11–30. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i54.11935

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